Mao Zedong’s explicit statements "thanking" Japan for its invasion are highly documented historical facts. These remarks were made during multiple official audiences with Japanese diplomats, politicians, and business leaders between 1956 and 1972.The verbatim translated transcripts and specific details from these recorded meetings show the following:1. Meeting with Kozo Sasaki (Japanese Socialist Party) — July 10, 1964This is the most famous and legally unabridged transcript regarding this topic, held in Beijing.The Context: Sasaki apologized to Mao for the immense suffering and damage the Imperial Japanese Army caused the Chinese people.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"No! Without your imperial army invading half of China, the Chinese people would not have been able to unite against you, and the Chinese Communist Party would not have been able to seize power. So the Japanese Imperial Army has been a good instructor for us, and for you."Further in the Conversation:"Some Japanese friends said, 'We are very sorry that the Japanese military invaded China.' I said, 'No, if your monopoly capital and warlords hadn't done a 'good deed' for us, how could we have met here? I would like to thank the Japanese warlords if I need to thank them.'"2. Meeting with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka — September 27, 1972This conversation took place during the monumental normalization of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan.The Context: At a state banquet, Prime Minister Tanaka attempted to formally apologize by stating that Japan had caused great "trouble" (meiwaku / 添了麻烦) to the Chinese people.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"We must express our gratitude to Japan. If Japan didn't invade China, we could have never achieved the cooperation between the KMT and the Communist Party. We could have never developed and eventually taken political power for ourselves. It is due to Japan's help that we are able to meet here in Beijing."The Follow-up: Because of Mao's unique stance, China officially waived all post-WWII war reparations and financial compensation claims against Japan during these 1972 negotiations.3. Meeting with Toshio Kuroda — January 24, 1961Mao met with a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party and expanded on his philosophy of viewing the Japanese military as a tool that saved the CCP.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"Because the Japanese military occupied more than half of China, the Chinese people were able to learn. If there had been no invasion, we would still be in our remote guerrilla bases today and wouldn't be able to watch Peking Opera in Beijing. Because we built anti-Japanese base areas to fight the invasion, we created favorable conditions for our subsequent victory in the Civil War."4. Meeting with General Saburo Endo — 1956Saburo Endo was a former Lieutenant General of the Imperial Japanese Army who visited China after the war.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"You are our teachers, and we must thank you. It was the war that united the uncoordinated Chinese people and forced them to bond together."How Historians Analyze These TranscriptsThere are two primary, competing historical interpretations of these transcripts:The Literal & Strategic Reality: Historians pointing out the structural collapse of the Republic of China (KMT) emphasize that Mao was speaking the unvarnished geopolitical truth. The Japanese invasion physically ground down Chiang Kai-shek's best divisions, drained his treasury, and created the exact lawless territorial vacuums in rural China that the CCP needed to grow from a weak guerrilla group into a millions-strong army.The "Negative Teacher" Rhetoric: The official line of Chinese state-approved historians is that Mao was using dark humor, irony, and Marxist dialectics. In Communist theory, a brutal oppressor is often called a "negative teacher" (反面教材)—meaning an enemy whose extreme cruelty inadvertently forces the oppressed masses to wake up, revolutionize, and overthrow the old system.Regardless of whether Mao intended it as brutal geopolitical pragmatism or dark philosophical sarcasm, the historical transcripts confirm that he explicitly credited the Japanese invasion as the single most critical catalyst for the CCP's survival and ultimate rise to power.
毛泽东公开“感谢”日本侵略的言论是有据可查的历史事实。这些言论出自1956年至1972年间毛泽东多次接见日本外交官、政界人士和商界领袖的正式会晤。这些会晤的逐字翻译记录和具体细节表明：
1.与佐佐木幸三（日本社会党）的会面——1964年7月10日。这是关于此主题最著名且法律上完整无删节的记录，会面地点在北京。背景：佐佐木就日本帝国军队给中国人民造成的巨大苦难和破坏向毛泽东道歉。毛泽东的原话回应：“不！如果没有你们的帝国军队侵略半个中国，中国人民就无法团结起来反对你们，中国共产党也无法夺取政权。所以，日本帝国军队对我们和你们来说都是很好的老师。”谈话继续：“一些日本朋友说，‘我们对日本军队侵略中国感到非常遗憾。’我说，‘不，如果不是你们的垄断资本和军阀为我们做了件“好事”，我们怎么可能在这里见面？如果需要感谢的话，我想感谢日本军阀。
’”2. 1972年9月27日，毛泽东与日本首相田中角荣会面。此次会谈正值中华人民共和国与日本关系正常化这一具有里程碑意义的时期。背景：在一次国宴上，田中首相试图正式道歉，称日本给中国人民带来了“大麻烦”。毛泽东的原话回应：“我们必须对日本表示感谢。如果日本没有侵略中国，我们就不可能实现国民党和共产党之间的合作，也不可能发展壮大，最终掌握政权。正是由于日本的帮助，我们才能在北京会面。”后续：由于毛泽东独特的立场，在1972年的谈判中，中国正式放弃了所有二战后对日本的战争赔款和经济赔偿要求。 1961年1月24日，毛泽东会见了日本社会党代表团，并进一步阐述了他关于日本军队是拯救中国共产党的工具的理念。毛泽东的原话是：“因为日本军队占领了中国一半以上的领土，中国人民才得以学习。如果没有侵略，我们今天仍然会待在偏远的游击队基地，也无法在北京观看京剧。因为我们建立了抗日基地来抵抗侵略，才为我们后来在内战中取得胜利创造了有利条件。
”4. 1956年与远藤三郎将军会面——远藤三郎是日本帝国陆军前中将，战后访问中国。毛泽东的原话是：“你们是我们的老师，我们感谢你们。正是战争使原本分散的中国人民团结起来，凝聚成一个整体。”历史学家如何分析这些记录？对这些记录主要有两种相互竞争的历史解读：字面意义与战略意义：历史学家指出中华民国（国民党）的结构性崩溃，强调毛泽东所言乃是赤裸裸的地缘政治真相。日军入侵从根本上削弱了蒋介石的精锐部队，耗尽了他的国库，并在中国农村地区制造了中共急需的混乱局面，使其得以从一支弱小的游击队发展成为一支拥有数百万兵力的军队。“反面教材”论调：中国官方认可的历史学家认为，毛泽东运用了黑色幽默、反讽和马克思主义辩证法。在共产主义理论中，残暴的压迫者常被称为“反面教材”，指的是敌人的极端残暴无意中迫使被压迫群众觉醒、进行革命并推翻旧制度。无论毛泽东的本意是出于残酷的地缘政治实用主义，还是出于黑色哲学的讽刺，历史文献都证实，他明确地将日军入侵视为中共得以生存并最终夺取政权的最关键催化剂。
Mao Zedong’s explicit statements "thanking" Japan for its invasion are highly documented historical facts. These remarks were made during multiple official audiences with Japanese diplomats, politicians, and business leaders between 1956 and 1972.The verbatim translated transcripts and specific details from these recorded meetings show the following:1. Meeting with Kozo Sasaki (Japanese Socialist Party) — July 10, 1964This is the most famous and legally unabridged transcript regarding this topic, held in Beijing.The Context: Sasaki apologized to Mao for the immense suffering and damage the Imperial Japanese Army caused the Chinese people.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"No! Without your imperial army invading half of China, the Chinese people would not have been able to unite against you, and the Chinese Communist Party would not have been able to seize power. So the Japanese Imperial Army has been a good instructor for us, and for you."Further in the Conversation:"Some Japanese friends said, 'We are very sorry that the Japanese military invaded China.' I said, 'No, if your monopoly capital and warlords hadn't done a 'good deed' for us, how could we have met here? I would like to thank the Japanese warlords if I need to thank them.'"2. Meeting with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka — September 27, 1972This conversation took place during the monumental normalization of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan.The Context: At a state banquet, Prime Minister Tanaka attempted to formally apologize by stating that Japan had caused great "trouble" (meiwaku / 添了麻烦) to the Chinese people.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"We must express our gratitude to Japan. If Japan didn't invade China, we could have never achieved the cooperation between the KMT and the Communist Party. We could have never developed and eventually taken political power for ourselves. It is due to Japan's help that we are able to meet here in Beijing."The Follow-up: Because of Mao's unique stance, China officially waived all post-WWII war reparations and financial compensation claims against Japan during these 1972 negotiations.3. Meeting with Toshio Kuroda — January 24, 1961Mao met with a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party and expanded on his philosophy of viewing the Japanese military as a tool that saved the CCP.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"Because the Japanese military occupied more than half of China, the Chinese people were able to learn. If there had been no invasion, we would still be in our remote guerrilla bases today and wouldn't be able to watch Peking Opera in Beijing. Because we built anti-Japanese base areas to fight the invasion, we created favorable conditions for our subsequent victory in the Civil War."4. Meeting with General Saburo Endo — 1956Saburo Endo was a former Lieutenant General of the Imperial Japanese Army who visited China after the war.Mao’s Verbatim Response:"You are our teachers, and we must thank you. It was the war that united the uncoordinated Chinese people and forced them to bond together."How Historians Analyze These TranscriptsThere are two primary, competing historical interpretations of these transcripts:The Literal & Strategic Reality: Historians pointing out the structural collapse of the Republic of China (KMT) emphasize that Mao was speaking the unvarnished geopolitical truth. The Japanese invasion physically ground down Chiang Kai-shek's best divisions, drained his treasury, and created the exact lawless territorial vacuums in rural China that the CCP needed to grow from a weak guerrilla group into a millions-strong army.The "Negative Teacher" Rhetoric: The official line of Chinese state-approved historians is that Mao was using dark humor, irony, and Marxist dialectics. In Communist theory, a brutal oppressor is often called a "negative teacher" (反面教材)—meaning an enemy whose extreme cruelty inadvertently forces the oppressed masses to wake up, revolutionize, and overthrow the old system.Regardless of whether Mao intended it as brutal geopolitical pragmatism or dark philosophical sarcasm, the historical transcripts confirm that he explicitly credited the Japanese invasion as the single most critical catalyst for the CCP's survival and ultimate rise to power.